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BigBadBrian
01-26-2006, 11:03 AM
And Now Iran
We can't rule out the use of military force.
by William Kristol
01/23/2006, Volume 011, Issue 18


An unrepentant rogue state with a history of sponsoring terrorists seeks to develop weapons of mass destruction. The United States tries to work with European allies to deal with the problem peacefully, depending on International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and United Nations sanctions. The Europeans are generally hesitant and wishful. Russia and China are difficult and obstructive. Eventually the reality of the threat, the obduracy of the rogue state regime in power, becomes too obvious to be ignored.

This is not a history lesson about Iraq. These are today's headlines about Iran, where the regime is openly pursuing its ambition to become a nuclear power. "But this time diplomacy has to be given a chance to work," the doves coo. "Maybe this time Israel will take care of the problem," some hawks whisper. Both are being escapist.

Doves profess concern about Iran's nuclear program and endorse various diplomatic responses to it. But they don't want even to contemplate the threat of military action. Perhaps military action won't ultimately be necessary. But the only way diplomatic, political, and economic pressure has a chance to work over the next months is if the military option--or various military options--are kept on the table.

Meanwhile, some hawks, defenders of the Iraq war, would prefer to deal with one challenge at a time. They hope we can kick the can down the road a while longer, or that a deus ex machine--a Jewish one!--will appear to do our job for us. But great powers don't get to avoid their
urgent responsibilities because they'd prefer to deal with only one problem at a time, or to slough those responsibilities off onto others. To be clear: We support diplomatic, political, and economic efforts to halt the nuclear program of the Iranian regime. We support multilateral efforts through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, and the assembling of coalitions of the willing, if necessary, to support sanctions and other forms of pressure. We support serious efforts to help democrats and dissidents in Iran, in the hope that regime change can be achieved without military action from the outside. We support strengthening our covert and intelligence capabilities. And we support holding open the possibility of, and beginning to prepare for, various forms of military action.

Many people-the New York Times editorial board, much of Europe, even some in the Bush administration-don't really believe a nuclear Iran is unacceptable. They're of course all for various multilateral efforts to persuade President Ahmadinejad and Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of Iran's Council of Expediency, as well as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to change their minds and abandon their nuclear ambitions. But the Times, and much of Europe, and some in the administration, don't really pretend that these attempts at persuasion are likely to work. At the end of the day, they think we can live with a nuclear Iran. After all, containment and deterrence worked with the Soviet Union; they could also work with Iran, one mid-level State Department official said in an unguarded moment in my presence a couple of months ago.

We don't agree--and we don't think President Bush does, either. A Cuban missile crisis with Khrushchev's Soviet Union was bad enough. Are we willing to risk it with Ahmadinejad's Iran? What about nuclear proliferation throughout the region? What about the hopes for a liberal, less-extremist-and-terror-friendly Middle East?

Advocates of containment and deterrence should step forward to make their case openly and honestly. We look forward to engaging them in a real debate. Right now, if you read the Times editorial page, or Timothy Garton Ash in the London Guardian, there's lots of talk about the unfortunate behavior of Iran, lots of urging of good-faith multilateral efforts--and lots of finger-wagging warnings against even thinking of military action. This isn't serious.

Others, fortunately, are more serious. The Washington Post editorial page, for one, endorses political and economic steps of real consequence, warns against letting diplomacy degenerate into appeasement, proposes to test the seriousness of our allies and nations like Russia and China--and refuses to rule out the threat of military action.

And President Bush and Condoleezza Rice are serious. They are now speaking with new urgency, since the Iranian government is testing us, and its nuclear program could well be getting close to the point of no return. And they know that they have to speak with confidence and authority. Our adversaries cannot be allowed to believe that, because some of the intelligence on Iraq was bad, or because the insurgency in Iraq has been difficult, we will be at all intimidated from taking the necessary steps
against the current regime in Tehran.

Link (http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/585tdlqf.asp?pg=2)

FORD
01-26-2006, 11:25 AM
William Kristol = Treasonous PNAC piece of shit.

Go home and defend your own country and stay the fuck out of mine.

Nickdfresh
01-26-2006, 11:27 AM
I've heard that IRAN is no where near "the bomb"...

FORD
01-26-2006, 11:29 AM
Originally posted by Nickdfresh
I've heard that IRAN is no where near "the bomb"...

The treasonous bastards lied about Iraq's weapons. Naturally, they would lie about Iran's as well.

thome
01-26-2006, 12:00 PM
Originally posted by FORD
The treasonous bastards lied about Iraq's weapons. Naturally, they would lie about Iran's as well.

Iran would never lie to You or The World, Would they.Rite..?

Iran are the Good Guys, Rite ...?

Human Rites pioneers and Their women are their greatest treasure Rite?

The Iranian Government has never made a threat against the US
or israel .Rite..?

It's never been mentioned by the Iranian Govt' that the first -Test- of one of their Nukes would be over israel...Rite..?

Its all Made up by The BCE. Iran Never existed until Bush became president.The 1980 Hostage crisis was orchestrated by the BCE..Rite..?

The Evil that permeates in all aspects of the world since the beginning of Time is all made up by the BCE...Rite.?

Have fun When you are ready to clarify what your true base of operations is I'm listening.

As in would you like to see America destroyed or are you just a
constant complainer of all things that have to do with, where you
live and breathe and work and play and smoke and drink and love and
.......etc. Rite..?

Nickdfresh
01-26-2006, 12:41 PM
posted by jeffrey under iran

This is first part in a three part series on Iran’s nuclear capabilities that I am writing at the urging of Noah Shachtman from DefenseTech.

When some moron like Charles Krauthammer claims Iran is now just “months” away from a bomb, you can pretty much ignore him: He has no idea what he is talking about.

Overall, Iran is probably a little less than a decade away from developing a nuclear weapon. The key question here is how long it will take Iran to enrich a few tens of kilograms of uranium to more than 90 percent U-235.

Dafna Linzer reported that the US Intelligence Community does not believe that Iran could do so before “early to mid next decade”—a revision of previous assessments that Iran would “have the ability to produce nuclear weapons early in the next decade.”

Why so long? The answer is that Iran still has to build, install and operate its centrifuges to enrich uranium.

David Albright and Corey Hinderstein at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) released an estimate that breaks down the steps for Iran to make fissile material for a bomb, along with a nifty satellite image (at right) of Iran’s Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.

Most references to Iran being “months” away from a bomb are really statements about how close Iran will be once it completes the FEP—something, as you will soon see, that will take a few years.

***

But, first a little digression …

Iran plans to house about 50,000 centrifues in the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz in order to produce low enriched uranium for a notional civil nuclear power program. The output of a centrifuge is measured in “seperative work units”—a measure of the amount of work required to enrich a given amount (product) uranium. In math:

Separative work per unit of product = V(XP) – V (XW) – F/P *[V(XF) – V(XW)]

V(S) = (2*S – 100) * LOG (S/(100-S)]

F/P = (XP- XW)/(XF-XW), where

XF = feed assay (W/O)
XP = product assay (W/O)
XW = tails assay (W/O)
V = separation potential
S = XF, XP, or XW
F/P = feed to product ratio

URENCO understood that most of us find math a quaint endeavor in the age of the calculator, so they posted a sweet SWU calculator on their website. Now, you too can caclulate how much SWU is required to produce 25 kg of HEU (a few thousand depending on some technical factors).

Each of Iran’s centrifuges has an output between 2-3 SWU/year. Iran plans a that the full scale FEP at Natanz will house 50,000 centrifuges, giving the plant a capacity of 150,000 SWU/year—enough for annual reloads of LEU for the Bushehr reactor or, if configured differently, 25-30 nuclear weapons worth of HEU per year. (More on Natanz)

Of course, those are Iran’s plans. Iran probably only has about 700 centrifuges, as well as components for another 1,000 or so.

***

So, the real question, however, is how quickly Iran could assemble and operate 1,500 centrifuges in a crash program to make enough HEU for one bomb (say 15-20 kg).

Albright and Hinderstein have created a notional timeline for such a program:

* Assemble 1,300-1,600 centrifuges. Assuming Iran starts assembling centrifuges at a rate of 70-100/month, Iran will have enough centrifuges in 6-9 months.

* Combine centrifuges into cascades, install control equipment, building feed and withdrawal systems, and test the Fuel Enrichment Plant. 1 year

* Enrich enough HEU for a nuclear weapon. 1 year

* Weaponize the HEU. A “few” months.

Total time to the bomb—about three years.

David and Corey state that this timeline is a worst case estimate that assumes Iran encounters no significant problems along the way:

This result reflects a worst case assessment, and thus is highly uncertain. Though some analysts at the IAEA believe that Iran could assemble centrifuges quicker, other analysts, including those in the US intelligence community, appear to believe that a date of 2009 would be overly optimistic. They believe that Iran is likely to encounter technical difficulties that would significantly delay bringing a centrifuge plant into operation. Factors causing delay include Iran having trouble making so many centrifuges in that time period or it taking longer than expected to overcome difficulties in operating the cascades or building a centrifuge plant.

The interesting question is what technical problems the US IC expects Iran to encounter. The thing about a crash program is that things, well, crash. In another paper, Albright and Hinderstein note some of the potential problems:

Iran might not be able to meet such a schedule for bringing a centrifuge plant into operation. The suspension of manufacturing and operating centrifuges could be reestablished, or Iran might have trouble making so many centrifuges. In addition, Iran does not appear to have accumulated enough experience to operate a cascade of centrifuges reliably. Iran had assembled 164 centrifuges into a cascade just before the suspension, but it did not acquire sufficient experience in operating the cascade to be certain it would perform adequately. Centrifuges can crash during operation, causing other centrifuges in the cascade to fail—in essence, destroying the entire cascade. Thus, Iran might need a year or more of additional experience in operating test cascades before building and operating a plant able to make HEU for nuclear weapons.

Yes, centrifuges spinning at supersonic speeds can crash. Especially if you don’t get the lead out.

***

Well, not really lead—but molybdenum hexafluoride (MoF6) (Folks in the 18th century thought molybdenum was lead—hence the name derived from molybdos, or lead in Greek).

I’ve previously emphasized one technical problem—the inability of Iran to make relatively pure uranium hexafluoride (“hex”) to be fed into centrifuges for enrichment. (See Got Gas? Iran Stinks at Making UF6, Aug 13, 2005)

Before introducing UF6 into a centrifuge cascade, the Iranians must rid the gas of impurities like MoF6 or the impurities will plug cascade piping, crashing Iran’s centrifuges.

Richard Stone in this week’s Science Magazine further documents the problems that Iran is having purifying hex at its Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) near Esfahan:

Creating purified UF6, which can be fed as a gas into centrifuges for isotope separation, would be a much bigger one. According to an official at the U.S. State Department, Iran has struggled to convert UF4 into UF6, a dangerous process involving highly toxic and corrosive fluorine gas. The official also claims that Iranian UF4 is tainted with large amounts of molybdenum and other heavy metals. These oxyfluoride impurities in UF6 “might condense” and thereby “risk blockages” of valves and piping, an IAEA specialist told Science.

Iran’s bad at making hex in part because the Clinton Administration convinced the Chinese to stop building the UCF—a major nonproliferation victory that Stone mentions. Stone cites an interview that Dr Mohammad Saeidi, AEOI deputy for planning and international affairs, discussing the deleterious impact of the Chinese cut-off. (See: Sticks and Stones: China, Iran and the UCF, Sep 05, 2005 . Contains the full-text of the interview, in the event you’re interested.)

Stone also mentions a series of stories by Mark Hibbs detailing Iran’s difficulty in using pulse columns to purify uranium. (Iran’s UF6 Is Crap, Sep 28, 2005 and Chinese mixer-settlers at UCF, Oct 20, 2005).

How long will it take Iran to get it’s act together on hex? Hibbs reported a wide variety of estimates among intelligence services:

Intelligence analysts do not agree on how long it will take Iran to solve current process chemical problems at its restarted Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan.

These difficulties have thus far prevented Iran from producing uncontaminated uranium hexafluoride (UF6) feedstock for its gas centrifuge enrichment program. Last month, as Iran prepared to operate the plant, Vienna officials said that Iran would require “at least several months” to address its problems (NF, 15 Aug., 1).

According to Israeli government analysts now examining related technical issues, it may take Iran two or three months to begin producing pure UF6. According to U.K. government experts, however, Iran may need about 18 months to do that.

But government analysts do agree on one point: The higher the enrichment level sought by Iran from its gas centrifuges, the more critical it will be for Iran to first eliminate technical problems associated with producing pure UF6.

***

Iran still faces a number of technical challenges before it can start churning out fissile material. Those challenges are going to years to solve.

Parts 2 and 3 will discuss whether Iran could mate a warhead to a missile and prospects for a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Link (http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/945/iran-focus-part-1-how-close-is-iran-to-the-bomb)

So IRAN won't have a weapon before at least 2009 (if everything goes perfectly for them), wow, go hide in the cellar in fear.:rolleyes:

Hardrock69
01-26-2006, 01:51 PM
Just as I mentioned about the Communist News Network and their propaganda...this is just a rehash of Iraq (despite what the ignorant idiots think).

1. News organizations begin to talk about Iran, what they might do IF they developed Nuclear Weapons, or IF we went to war with them, etc. etc.

Lots of negativity, etc. to get the public stirred up.

2. Start making claims that "they are on the very verge of having nuclear weapons!" and publicise the same to the skies, regardless of whether or not there is any truth to it.

3. Begin to put pressure on the U.N. and other democratic nations to creat an embargo. That is the first step.

4. Second step of item 3 is to threaten Iran with force.

5. Third step is to actually invade Iran.


The actual peaceful way (as far as the U.S. is concerned) is to have someone else invade Iran and take it over.

We have our hands full with Iraq and AssRamistan right now.

We cannot afford to invade and occupy a third fucking country.

I am not saying Iran is some kind of "nice" country. There are a bunch of fucking assholes in charge over there. But as with Iraq, there are many in the populace who surely wish they could live in a democracy where the religious police are not beating down people for dressing like an American, or for trying to have a point of view different from Islamic teachings.


Syria is a fucked up country as well.

But someone else needs to step up to the plate and involve themselves in this shit.

We have done enough already.

BITEYOASS
01-26-2006, 03:22 PM
Something tells me that Israel is gonna bomb the shit out of that facility, Iran will then get pissed and try to through Iraq to get them back. So we're definitely gonna be in a mess of it, bush or no bush.

thome
01-26-2006, 04:11 PM
Excellent post HR.

There is a opportunity for a Momentos occasion for dialogue and peace
in the Mid-East.Either that or we are all going to get to know each other real well. Not in a good way.

The funny thing is the people of the Mid-East have no Idea thier GREAT rullers are flying to, Paris, Cayman Islands, Las Vegas, every weekend to enjoy all the visces they say America is guilty of
and one day their eyes will be opened towards their own leaders
then the Sh!t will really hit the fan.

I hope we all get to know each other without the need for the, "Look at me, i gotte nuke."
I'm more worried about the ability to make a dirty bomb than
a ICBM.

Nickdfresh
01-26-2006, 06:03 PM
Why would you be worried about a "dirty bomb?" They don't exist and they don't work, that's been proven, yet your gov't will never mention that...

Good luck on the invading IRAN part though, we'll only need to double the size of the armed forces for that one...

thome
01-26-2006, 06:21 PM
Originally posted by Nickdfresh
Why would you be worried about a "dirty bomb?" They don't exist and they don't work, that's been proven, yet your gov't will never mention that...

Good luck on the invading IRAN part though, we'll only need to double the size of the armed forces for that one...

Is not a dirty bomb simply a explosive device used to distibute
depleated uranium.

That would hurt for 75 yrs of Neurotoxins and Teratogens.
that's poison and abnormal cell growth spread over my trailer park.

I prefer to get that from my ciggs' one day at a time not 75 years
of it shoved in my lungs in one breath.

smarty..

Nickdfresh
01-26-2006, 08:44 PM
Originally posted by thome
Is not a dirty bomb simply a explosive device used to distibute
depleated uranium.

That would hurt for 75 yrs of Neurotoxins and Teratogens.
that's poison and abnormal cell growth spread over my trailer park.


IT DOESN'T WORK. THE "DEPLETED URANIUM" IS BLOWN TO DUST THAT IS COMPLETELY INEFFECTIVE and easy to clean up. Both IRAQ and the US experimented this, they found it's BS...


I prefer to get that from my ciggs' one day at a time not 75 years
of it shoved in my lungs in one breath.

smarty..

The lung cancer will kill you far sooner than terra-ists ever will...

Hardrock69
01-26-2006, 09:17 PM
Ok post evidence.

I have read that depleted uranium DOES cause many health problems.

Hell, it is not as depleted as the word suggests.

Not only that, if you breathe it into your lungs, it does not automatically just blow away instantly as it would if you got it on your hands or some shit...it can become a part of the food chain, and can really fuck up an ecosystem...

Iraq is on it's way to becoming a radioactive wasteland....WITHOUT have to use the A-bomb.

Here....read some of this....

It is pretty harmful stuff....

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/95178_du12.shtml

Nickdfresh
01-27-2006, 07:00 AM
Originally posted by Hardrock69
Ok post evidence.

I have read that depleted uranium DOES cause many health problems.

Hell, it is not as depleted as the word suggests.

Not only that, if you breathe it into your lungs, it does not automatically just blow away instantly as it would if you got it on your hands or some shit...it can become a part of the food chain, and can really fuck up an ecosystem...

Iraq is on it's way to becoming a radioactive wasteland....WITHOUT have to use the A-bomb.

Here....read some of this....

It is pretty harmful stuff....

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/95178_du12.shtml

We're not talking about "depleted ammunition." Dirty bombs would essentially disperse radio active material, reducing it to very small particles, that the actual levels would be essentially harmless...

Dirty Bombs and Other Radiological Weapons
by Wm. Robert Johnston
last updated 15 September 2005

Introduction

So-called "dirty bombs" are one type of radiological weapon. Radiological weapons disperse radioactive material with conventional explosives, by fire, or otherwise by dilution (as in water or air).

Dirty bombs have been the topic of much public discussion since the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001. The quality of this discussion has varied considerably. Consider some common misconceptions contrasted with facts:

# Myth: Dirty bombs would cause large numbers of casualities.
Fact: In general, radiological weapons would not be effective at producing casualties, although the economic and psychological impact could be severe.

# Myth: The longer the half-life of a radioactive material, the deadlier it is.
Fact: Radioactive material is not necessarily more dangerous if it has a longer half-life. For a given number of radioactive atoms, a longer half-life means the quantity is less radioactive.
# Myth: A devastating dirty bomb could be made with low-level nuclear waste or weapons-grade materials.
Fact: Nuclear wastes are less likely options for weapon source material. Commercial radioactive sources are a security concern because of the combination of their activity levels and accessibility.
# Myth: Terrorists need only attack a nuclear reactor to cause large numbers of casualties.
Fact: The containment structure as well as the reactor design for U.S. commercial nuclear power plants make a deadly radiation release, even through sabotage or attack, exceedingly difficult to produce.
# Myth: Available radioactive sources could be easily blown up to disperse high radiation over large areas.
Fact: Some recent expert testimony does not address the fact that the effects of a dirty bomb are highly dependent on the size of the radioactive particles produced.
# Myth: Current federal radiation standards represent safe levels that radiation clean-up must attain.
Fact: Under current policy, clean-up after a radiological attack would be governed by EPA guidelines --guidelines which are far in excess of anything justified by health considerations.

Description

Nuclear weapons (such as atomic bombs or thermonuclear bombs) induce nuclear reactions in certain materials--materials less radioactive than the products of the reactions. This produces large energy releases along with radioactive daughter products more radioactive than the original material. In contrast, radiological weapons disperse material that is already radioactive. In such weapons there is no energy release from nuclear reactions and no increase in radioactivity.

This means that in order for a radiological weapon to disperse large amounts of radiation, it must contain highly radioactive material to begin with. Consequently, such weapons are very dangerous to work with and relatively easy to detect--by remote detection of radiation--although the ease of detection depends on specific properties of the radioactive material.

Radiological weapons are generally not effective weapons, as will be seen. A few countries have pursued the development of radiological military weapons, only to abandon these efforts in favor of more practical and effective weapons. By 1953 the USSR developed a radiological warhead for the R-2 ballistic missile, which was retired as nuclear warheads became available. In 1987 Iraq pursued development of a radiological weapon, but this was discontinued as Iraq concentrated on chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons programs.

Materials

Some radioactive materials pose a limited threat because of relatively low activity levels. Low-level nuclear waste, such as that generated by hospitals and industry, is found at many locations. However, the radioactivity in such waste is not concentrated enough to pose much practical health risk. Indeed, much of this material likely poses greater chemical or biological risks than radiation risks.

This also applies to some fissile material. Fissile material is material capable of undergoing nuclear chain reactions; in different forms, it fuels nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons. Enriched uranium does not pose a significant risk. Plutonium is a greater concern. However, such material is tightly guarded since in sufficent quantities it could be used in a nuclear weapon.

Possible radioactive source material includes commercially used isotopes. These are generally found in small quantities, except for source manufacturing sites where controls are stricter.

High level nuclear waste, such as spent fuel, is unlikely to be used. Such material is hard to obtain, hard to work with, and hard to hide. Security for spent fuel is significant and has been for years, given the fact that it contains fissile material useful for nuclear weapons. Additionally, the safeguards that are used to deal with the hazardous nature of such waste makes theft difficult.

Dispersion

The factor of the effectiveness of dispersing radioactive material has been poorly addressed by much recent testimony.

Radioactive material in the form of very small particles or vapor will disperse more outdoors, diluting any effects. Very large particles will not travel far from the point of dispersion. It has often been asserted that "dirty bombs" are relatively simple to devise. This ignores the technical challenge of devising a weapon that will produce an optimum particle size resulting in an effective weapon.

Consider the dispersion of material by the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Only about 5% of the radioactive inventory of the reactor was released into the atmosphere: about 12,000,000 curies was released in the initial explosion and another 40,000,000 curies by the fire during the next 9 days. (In contrast, a 20-kt nuclear explosion results in radioactive daughter products with radioactivity of 600,000,000 curies one minute after detonation and 5,000,000 curies one hour after detonation.)

Spent nuclear reactor fuel rods contain thousands to millions of curies of radioactivity, but these are too dangerous handle and are kept under high security anyway. Some cobalt rods used in industrial applications contain 10,000 curies; such rods have been cited as illustrative sources for radiological weapons.

Biological effects

In the short term, radiation exposure of sufficient levels can cause radiation sickness or death. In the long term, radiation exposure may increase the risk of various types of cancer.

Some specific isotopes pose a particular health risk. Biological processes tend to concentrate certain chemicals in certain organs. For example, radioactive iodine, if absorbed into the body, would tend to concentrate in the thyroid gland, causing radiation injury.

The consequences of some past radiation accidents illustrate the risks. In 1987 a 1,400-curie cesium-137 source was spilled from a discared x-ray machine in a junkyard in Goiania, Brazil. Several people played with the powder, spreading throughout the area. Eventually four people died and about 30 others suffered radiation injuries. Similar but less severe accidents occurred in Mexico in 1983, Turkey in 1998, and Egypt in 2000. Contaimination and injury were so severe, in part, because the radiation release went unrecognized for so long and often because people involved took the material into their houses. One fatality from the Goiania case was a young girl who rubbed the cesium all over her body. Thus even though these were accidents, not intentional attacks, they involved circumstances which permitted doses to accumulate over a longer period of time--circumstances unlikely for a radiological attack. While a radiological weapon would likely involve a more effective means of dispersal, the release is unlikely to go undetected for any significant period of time. Still, such cases do demonstrate that the potential of prompt radiation casualties cannot be excluded.

Response

If a radiological attack occurs, the response will be seriously hampered by the lack of public education and the lack of civil defense efforts. The American public is not merely uninformed, but misinformed regarding radiation, its effects, and methods of protection. Given current concerns about nuclear terrorism, it is unfortunate that public authorities have not seriously attempted to correct this.

Current plans apparently assume the application of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards for clean-up of contamination. These standards will result in massive unnecessary economic impact. Consider that EPA standards are 30 times stricter than those for civilian radiation workers, 100 times stricter than the threshold for detectable long term effects, 10,000 times stricter than the threshold for short term effects, and 100 times stricter than the standards applied at the Chernobyl site.

In fact the EPA's standards are unrealistic: they fail to realistically appraise radiation risks relative to other risks; they apply an unjustifiably higher standard to radiation from manmade sources than from natural sources; and they ignore current understanding of radiation hormesis. Revised standards may be forthcoming from the Department of Homeland Security, but even these will not settle the issue.

Link (http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/dirtybomb.html)

Also see: http://cfserv.dickinson.edu/cnExtra/detail.cfm?170

Cathedral
01-27-2006, 10:03 AM
I actually had hope that Russia would help to diffuse the situation, but it fell apart because Iran is acting like their balls weigh 10 tons.

The only thing they will agree to is something that gives them the ability to continue seeking nukes.

And they'll use them, to think otherwise is plain idiotic...

Hardrock69
01-27-2006, 01:08 PM
Nowhere in the above posts does it say that it is ok to contaminate an area populated by humans with depleted uranium because it is harmless.

:rolleyes: