ELVIS
02-27-2009, 05:05 AM
February 27, 2009 (http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1016/42/374870.htm)
By Ruslan Pukhov
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/upload//photos/large/2009_02/2009_02_27//8_2.jpg
Last week's three-day visit to Moscow by Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Najjar renewed the debate over Russia's weapons sales to Iran -- particularly the S-300 air defense system. International observers are uncertain about the status of the contract. Iranian sources report that deliveries have begun, whereas Russian officials refute those claims.
Based on the S-300 deal, it would seem that Moscow is more interested in using its relationship with Tehran as a bargaining chip with the West than in developing long-term commercial and defense ties between the two countries. To be sure, Iran doesn't completely trust the Kremlin's agenda. This distrust dates back to 1995, when Russia signed the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement that obligated Moscow to limit its arms trade with Tehran.
At the same time, the West urges Russia to show restraint toward Iran because of its nuclear program, but this position is flawed for several reasons. First, it is unclear why the West tries to link Russia's sale of conventional weapons such as the S-300 to Tehran's nuclear program, which has peaceful, civilian intentions, not military ones.
Second, even if Iran does intend to develop nuclear weapons in the future, they would be used for its own defense, not to destroy Israel. Despite its bellicose, threatening rhetoric, modern Iran is far removed from the extremist policies of the Khomeini era. Tehran's domestic and foreign policies remind me of the Soviet Union of the 1980s, when the Kremlin publicly conducted a highly demagogic battle against imperialism but privately tried to find common language with the West on many fronts. In this respect, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad resembles Soviet leader Yury Andropov, who ruled with an iron fist before he quickly deteriorated, as did the entire Soviet Union seven years later.
In reality, though, selling military hardware to Iran fully meets Russia's commercial and military interests. Sales are falling rapidly to China and India, which have been the two largest buyers of Russian weaponry over the past 15 years. China is largely able to manufacture the weapons needed for its own military, and India is increasingly looking for high-tech weaponry, a market in which Russia is weak. Moreover, India is open to buying from almost any weapons exporter, making the competition fierce. The bulk of Russia's weapons exports in recent years have gone to supplying the enormous demand for equipment using mid-range technologies sold at moderate prices. Those clients include Algeria, Venezuela and Malaysia. But the size of those markets is limited and cannot perpetually compensate for Russia's losses on the Chinese market or the lack of growth on the Indian market.
Under such conditions, it would be foolish to ignore the large Iranian market, worth roughly $300 million to $500 million per year. In addition, what Iran needs the most in terms of weapons systems is precisely what Russia's weapons manufactures can offer. But if Russia continues its restrained policy toward Iran, Tehran will likely turn to China, which will soon be able to offer competitive products in this segment.
What's more, Tehran is trying to develop its own military-industrial complex. That opens up prospects for expanding commercial cooperation between Iran and Russia, including the licensing and organization of Iranian factories for making Russian products, as well as joint production of military weaponry. For now, Ukrainian aircraft manufacturers lead in this form of cooperation with Iran. They are working with Iran's HESA company to produce a regional version of the An-140 and An-148 aircraft.
The commercial and military components of Russian-Iranian relations compliment the two countries' shared political interests. Both countries oppose a U.S. and NATO presence in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Both want to contain the expansion of Sunni radical extremism.
Moreover, if Moscow weakens its military and technical ties with Tehran, this may open the door for reconciliation between Iran and the United States. That could lead to Iran increasing its military and trade contacts with the United States and Western Europe. Russia could also lose the Iranian card to Ukraine and Eastern Europe, which may be very interested in increasing their ties to Tehran as well.
:elvis:
By Ruslan Pukhov
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/upload//photos/large/2009_02/2009_02_27//8_2.jpg
Last week's three-day visit to Moscow by Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Najjar renewed the debate over Russia's weapons sales to Iran -- particularly the S-300 air defense system. International observers are uncertain about the status of the contract. Iranian sources report that deliveries have begun, whereas Russian officials refute those claims.
Based on the S-300 deal, it would seem that Moscow is more interested in using its relationship with Tehran as a bargaining chip with the West than in developing long-term commercial and defense ties between the two countries. To be sure, Iran doesn't completely trust the Kremlin's agenda. This distrust dates back to 1995, when Russia signed the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement that obligated Moscow to limit its arms trade with Tehran.
At the same time, the West urges Russia to show restraint toward Iran because of its nuclear program, but this position is flawed for several reasons. First, it is unclear why the West tries to link Russia's sale of conventional weapons such as the S-300 to Tehran's nuclear program, which has peaceful, civilian intentions, not military ones.
Second, even if Iran does intend to develop nuclear weapons in the future, they would be used for its own defense, not to destroy Israel. Despite its bellicose, threatening rhetoric, modern Iran is far removed from the extremist policies of the Khomeini era. Tehran's domestic and foreign policies remind me of the Soviet Union of the 1980s, when the Kremlin publicly conducted a highly demagogic battle against imperialism but privately tried to find common language with the West on many fronts. In this respect, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad resembles Soviet leader Yury Andropov, who ruled with an iron fist before he quickly deteriorated, as did the entire Soviet Union seven years later.
In reality, though, selling military hardware to Iran fully meets Russia's commercial and military interests. Sales are falling rapidly to China and India, which have been the two largest buyers of Russian weaponry over the past 15 years. China is largely able to manufacture the weapons needed for its own military, and India is increasingly looking for high-tech weaponry, a market in which Russia is weak. Moreover, India is open to buying from almost any weapons exporter, making the competition fierce. The bulk of Russia's weapons exports in recent years have gone to supplying the enormous demand for equipment using mid-range technologies sold at moderate prices. Those clients include Algeria, Venezuela and Malaysia. But the size of those markets is limited and cannot perpetually compensate for Russia's losses on the Chinese market or the lack of growth on the Indian market.
Under such conditions, it would be foolish to ignore the large Iranian market, worth roughly $300 million to $500 million per year. In addition, what Iran needs the most in terms of weapons systems is precisely what Russia's weapons manufactures can offer. But if Russia continues its restrained policy toward Iran, Tehran will likely turn to China, which will soon be able to offer competitive products in this segment.
What's more, Tehran is trying to develop its own military-industrial complex. That opens up prospects for expanding commercial cooperation between Iran and Russia, including the licensing and organization of Iranian factories for making Russian products, as well as joint production of military weaponry. For now, Ukrainian aircraft manufacturers lead in this form of cooperation with Iran. They are working with Iran's HESA company to produce a regional version of the An-140 and An-148 aircraft.
The commercial and military components of Russian-Iranian relations compliment the two countries' shared political interests. Both countries oppose a U.S. and NATO presence in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Both want to contain the expansion of Sunni radical extremism.
Moreover, if Moscow weakens its military and technical ties with Tehran, this may open the door for reconciliation between Iran and the United States. That could lead to Iran increasing its military and trade contacts with the United States and Western Europe. Russia could also lose the Iranian card to Ukraine and Eastern Europe, which may be very interested in increasing their ties to Tehran as well.
:elvis: