DLR'sCock
06-17-2004, 11:18 AM
http://apnews1.iwon.com//article/20040616/D83860A00.html
9/11 Panel Says Iraq Rebuffed Bin Laden
By Hope Yen
Associated Press
Wednesday 16 June 2004
Washington - Bluntly contradicting the Bush administration, the commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks reported Wednesday there was "no credible evidence" that Saddam Hussein helped al-Qaida target the United States.
In a chilling report that sketched the history of Osama bin Laden's network, the commission said his far-flung training camps were "apparently quite good." Terrorists-to-be were encouraged to "think creatively about ways to commit mass murder," it added.
Bin Laden made overtures to Saddam for assistance, the commission said in the staff report, as he did with leaders in Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan and elsewhere as he sought to build an Islamic army.
While Saddam dispatched a senior Iraqi intelligence official to Sudan to meet with bin Laden in 1994, the commission said it had not turned up evidence of a "collaborative relationship."
The Bush administration has long claimed links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida, and cited them as one reason for last year's invasion of Iraq.
On Monday, Vice President Dick Cheney said in a speech that the Iraqi dictator "had long established ties with al-Qaida."
The bipartisan commission issued its findings as it embarked on two days of public hearings into the worst terrorist attacks in American history.
The panel intends to issue a final report in July on the hijackings on Sept. 11, 2001 that killed nearly 3,000, destroyed the World Trade Centers in New York and damaged the Pentagon outside Washington. A fourth plane commandeered by terrorists crashed in the countryside in Pennsylvania.
The staff report pieced together information on the development of bin Laden's network, from the far-flung training camps in Afghanistan and elsewhere, to funding from "well-placed financial facilitators and diversions of funds from Islamic charities."
Reports that bin Laden had a huge personal fortune to finance acts of terror are overstated, the report said.
The description of the training camp operations contained elements of faint, grudging praise.
"A worldwide jihad needed terrorists who could bomb embassies or hijack airliners, but it also needed foot soldiers for the Taliban in its war against the Northern Alliance, and guerrillas who could shoot down Russian helicopters in Chechnya or ambush Indian units in Kashmir," it said.
According to one unnamed senior al-Qaida associate, various ideas were floated by mujahadeen in Afghanistan, the commission said. The options included taking over a launcher and forcing Russian scientists to fire a nuclear missile at the United States, mounting mustard gas or cyanide attacks against Jewish areas in Iraq or releasing poison gas into the air conditioning system of a targeted building.
"Last but not least, hijacking an aircraft and crashing it into an airport or nearby city," it said.
The Iraq connection long suggested by administration officials gained no currency in the report.
"Bin Laden is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded," the report said. "There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida also occurred" after bin Laden moved his operations to Afghanistan in 1996, "but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship," it said.
"Two senior bin Laden associates have adamantly denied that any ties existed between al-Qaida and Iraq," the report said.
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Go to Original
9/11 Staff: No al Qaeda Cooperation With Iraq
CNN
Wednesday 16 June 2004
Washington - The commission investigating the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks found that the plot originally called for hijacking 10 planes and attacking targets on the eastern and western coasts of the United States.
The bipartisan commission issued its findings as it began two days of hearings.
According to commission:
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the plot, planned to have nine of the planes crash into the FBI and CIA headquarters, the Pentagon and the White House, as well as nuclear plants and the tallest buildings in California and Washington state.
Mohammed was arrested in March 2003 in Pakistan and turned over to U.S. authorities.
The hijackers of the 10th plane, which Mohammed planned to pilot, would contact the media, kill all of the adult men on board and then make a statement denouncing the United States before freeing the women and children.
The plot also called for hijacking and blowing up 12 airliners in Southeast Asia, but al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden scrapped that part of the plan because it was to difficult to coordinate operations on two continents.
Bin Laden scaled back the plot in the United States to the four planes that were eventually used in the attack.
They narrowed down the list of targets to the World Trade Center towers, the Pentagon and either the White House or the Capitol.
Bin Laden wanted to hit the White House, but Mohammed and Mohamed Atta, the leader of the 19 hijackers, favored the Capitol, because they felt it would be an easier target.
Mohammed initially proposed the attacks in 1996, but planning did not begin until 1999.
Bin Laden had wanted the attack to occur as early as mid-2000, after Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount tunnel, which preceded a Palestinian intifada. But the hijacker-pilots were not yet fully trained.
Bin Laden then pressed for a date earlier in 2001, such as May 12, the seven-month anniversary of the USS Cole attack, or in June or July, when Sharon was due to visit the White House. Again, the hijackers were not ready.
The September 11 date was not picked until three weeks before. The hijackers bought their tickets only two weeks before.
The plot cost an estimated $400,000 to $500,000, not including the hijackers' training in Afghanistan. The hijackers spent about $270,000 in the United States, mainly on flight training, travel, housing, and vehicles.
No al Qaeda, Iraq cooperation
The panel said it found "no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States."
The report contradicts statements from the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein had ties to al Qaeda.
In response, a senior administration official traveling with President Bush in Tampa, Florida, said, "We stand by what Powell and Tenet have said," referring to previous statements by Secretary of State Colin Powell and CIA Director George Tenet that described such links.
Bush and Vice President Cheney have made comments in recent days alleging such ties.
The commission's report says bin Laden "explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to (Saddam) Hussein's secular regime. Bin Laden had in fact at one time sponsored anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan.
"The Sudanese, to protect their own ties with Iraq, reportedly persuaded bin Laden to cease this support and arranged for contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda."
A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting bin Laden in 1994.
Bin Laden is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded.
"There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after bin Laden had returned to Afghanistan, but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship," the report said.
"Two senior bin Laden associates have adamantly denied" any relationship, the report said.
The panel also dismissed reports that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in the Czech Republic on April 9, 2000. "We do not believe that such a meeting occurred."
The report said that Atta was in Virginia on April 4 - evidenced by video that shows him withdrawing $8,000 from an ATM - and he was in Florida by April 11 if not before.
The report also found that there was no "convincing evidence that any government financially supported al Qaeda before 9/11" other than the limited support provided by the Taliban when bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan.
The toppling of the Taliban regime "fundamentally changed" al Qaeda, leaving it decentralized and altering Osama bin Laden's role.
Prior to the attacks, bin Laden approved all al Qaeda operations and often chose targets and the operatives involved himself, the report said.
"After al Qaeda lost Afghanistan after 9/11, it fundamentally changed. The organization is far more decentralized. Bin Laden's seclusion forced operational commanders and cell leaders to assume greater authority; they are now making the command decisions previously made by him," the report said.
Al Qaeda seeking nuclear weapons
The commission said that al Qaeda was seeking to obtain nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
Al Qaeda "remains interested in using a radiological dispersal device or 'dirty bomb,' a conventional explosive designed to spread radioactive material," the commission said.
The report said that al Qaeda may also seek to launch a chemical attack using widely available chemicals or by attacking a chemical plant or chemical shipments.
The commission also said that Tenet testified that a possible anthrax attack is "one of the most immediate threats the United States is likely to face."
Al Qaeda funding
Al Qaeda's funding came primarily from a fund-raising network, not business enterprises or bin Laden's personal fortune, the commission said.
Bin Laden owned some businesses and other assets in Sudan, but "most were small or not economically viable." The report says bin Laden "never received a $300 million inheritance," but from 1970 until approximately 1994 received about $1 million a year.
The commission found that Saudi Arabia was a rich fund-raising ground for al Qaeda, but that it had found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior officials within the Saudi government funded al Qaeda.
The group distributed the money as quickly as it was raised, with much of the money going to the Taliban for its operations in Afghanistan.
The CIA estimates that al Qaeda spent $30 million each year on expenses including terrorist operations, salaries and maintenance on terrorist training camps.
Its largest expense was payments to the Taliban, which was an estimated $10 million to $20 million per year.
9/11 Panel Says Iraq Rebuffed Bin Laden
By Hope Yen
Associated Press
Wednesday 16 June 2004
Washington - Bluntly contradicting the Bush administration, the commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks reported Wednesday there was "no credible evidence" that Saddam Hussein helped al-Qaida target the United States.
In a chilling report that sketched the history of Osama bin Laden's network, the commission said his far-flung training camps were "apparently quite good." Terrorists-to-be were encouraged to "think creatively about ways to commit mass murder," it added.
Bin Laden made overtures to Saddam for assistance, the commission said in the staff report, as he did with leaders in Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan and elsewhere as he sought to build an Islamic army.
While Saddam dispatched a senior Iraqi intelligence official to Sudan to meet with bin Laden in 1994, the commission said it had not turned up evidence of a "collaborative relationship."
The Bush administration has long claimed links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida, and cited them as one reason for last year's invasion of Iraq.
On Monday, Vice President Dick Cheney said in a speech that the Iraqi dictator "had long established ties with al-Qaida."
The bipartisan commission issued its findings as it embarked on two days of public hearings into the worst terrorist attacks in American history.
The panel intends to issue a final report in July on the hijackings on Sept. 11, 2001 that killed nearly 3,000, destroyed the World Trade Centers in New York and damaged the Pentagon outside Washington. A fourth plane commandeered by terrorists crashed in the countryside in Pennsylvania.
The staff report pieced together information on the development of bin Laden's network, from the far-flung training camps in Afghanistan and elsewhere, to funding from "well-placed financial facilitators and diversions of funds from Islamic charities."
Reports that bin Laden had a huge personal fortune to finance acts of terror are overstated, the report said.
The description of the training camp operations contained elements of faint, grudging praise.
"A worldwide jihad needed terrorists who could bomb embassies or hijack airliners, but it also needed foot soldiers for the Taliban in its war against the Northern Alliance, and guerrillas who could shoot down Russian helicopters in Chechnya or ambush Indian units in Kashmir," it said.
According to one unnamed senior al-Qaida associate, various ideas were floated by mujahadeen in Afghanistan, the commission said. The options included taking over a launcher and forcing Russian scientists to fire a nuclear missile at the United States, mounting mustard gas or cyanide attacks against Jewish areas in Iraq or releasing poison gas into the air conditioning system of a targeted building.
"Last but not least, hijacking an aircraft and crashing it into an airport or nearby city," it said.
The Iraq connection long suggested by administration officials gained no currency in the report.
"Bin Laden is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded," the report said. "There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida also occurred" after bin Laden moved his operations to Afghanistan in 1996, "but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship," it said.
"Two senior bin Laden associates have adamantly denied that any ties existed between al-Qaida and Iraq," the report said.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Go to Original
9/11 Staff: No al Qaeda Cooperation With Iraq
CNN
Wednesday 16 June 2004
Washington - The commission investigating the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks found that the plot originally called for hijacking 10 planes and attacking targets on the eastern and western coasts of the United States.
The bipartisan commission issued its findings as it began two days of hearings.
According to commission:
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the plot, planned to have nine of the planes crash into the FBI and CIA headquarters, the Pentagon and the White House, as well as nuclear plants and the tallest buildings in California and Washington state.
Mohammed was arrested in March 2003 in Pakistan and turned over to U.S. authorities.
The hijackers of the 10th plane, which Mohammed planned to pilot, would contact the media, kill all of the adult men on board and then make a statement denouncing the United States before freeing the women and children.
The plot also called for hijacking and blowing up 12 airliners in Southeast Asia, but al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden scrapped that part of the plan because it was to difficult to coordinate operations on two continents.
Bin Laden scaled back the plot in the United States to the four planes that were eventually used in the attack.
They narrowed down the list of targets to the World Trade Center towers, the Pentagon and either the White House or the Capitol.
Bin Laden wanted to hit the White House, but Mohammed and Mohamed Atta, the leader of the 19 hijackers, favored the Capitol, because they felt it would be an easier target.
Mohammed initially proposed the attacks in 1996, but planning did not begin until 1999.
Bin Laden had wanted the attack to occur as early as mid-2000, after Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount tunnel, which preceded a Palestinian intifada. But the hijacker-pilots were not yet fully trained.
Bin Laden then pressed for a date earlier in 2001, such as May 12, the seven-month anniversary of the USS Cole attack, or in June or July, when Sharon was due to visit the White House. Again, the hijackers were not ready.
The September 11 date was not picked until three weeks before. The hijackers bought their tickets only two weeks before.
The plot cost an estimated $400,000 to $500,000, not including the hijackers' training in Afghanistan. The hijackers spent about $270,000 in the United States, mainly on flight training, travel, housing, and vehicles.
No al Qaeda, Iraq cooperation
The panel said it found "no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States."
The report contradicts statements from the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein had ties to al Qaeda.
In response, a senior administration official traveling with President Bush in Tampa, Florida, said, "We stand by what Powell and Tenet have said," referring to previous statements by Secretary of State Colin Powell and CIA Director George Tenet that described such links.
Bush and Vice President Cheney have made comments in recent days alleging such ties.
The commission's report says bin Laden "explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to (Saddam) Hussein's secular regime. Bin Laden had in fact at one time sponsored anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan.
"The Sudanese, to protect their own ties with Iraq, reportedly persuaded bin Laden to cease this support and arranged for contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda."
A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting bin Laden in 1994.
Bin Laden is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded.
"There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after bin Laden had returned to Afghanistan, but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship," the report said.
"Two senior bin Laden associates have adamantly denied" any relationship, the report said.
The panel also dismissed reports that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in the Czech Republic on April 9, 2000. "We do not believe that such a meeting occurred."
The report said that Atta was in Virginia on April 4 - evidenced by video that shows him withdrawing $8,000 from an ATM - and he was in Florida by April 11 if not before.
The report also found that there was no "convincing evidence that any government financially supported al Qaeda before 9/11" other than the limited support provided by the Taliban when bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan.
The toppling of the Taliban regime "fundamentally changed" al Qaeda, leaving it decentralized and altering Osama bin Laden's role.
Prior to the attacks, bin Laden approved all al Qaeda operations and often chose targets and the operatives involved himself, the report said.
"After al Qaeda lost Afghanistan after 9/11, it fundamentally changed. The organization is far more decentralized. Bin Laden's seclusion forced operational commanders and cell leaders to assume greater authority; they are now making the command decisions previously made by him," the report said.
Al Qaeda seeking nuclear weapons
The commission said that al Qaeda was seeking to obtain nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
Al Qaeda "remains interested in using a radiological dispersal device or 'dirty bomb,' a conventional explosive designed to spread radioactive material," the commission said.
The report said that al Qaeda may also seek to launch a chemical attack using widely available chemicals or by attacking a chemical plant or chemical shipments.
The commission also said that Tenet testified that a possible anthrax attack is "one of the most immediate threats the United States is likely to face."
Al Qaeda funding
Al Qaeda's funding came primarily from a fund-raising network, not business enterprises or bin Laden's personal fortune, the commission said.
Bin Laden owned some businesses and other assets in Sudan, but "most were small or not economically viable." The report says bin Laden "never received a $300 million inheritance," but from 1970 until approximately 1994 received about $1 million a year.
The commission found that Saudi Arabia was a rich fund-raising ground for al Qaeda, but that it had found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior officials within the Saudi government funded al Qaeda.
The group distributed the money as quickly as it was raised, with much of the money going to the Taliban for its operations in Afghanistan.
The CIA estimates that al Qaeda spent $30 million each year on expenses including terrorist operations, salaries and maintenance on terrorist training camps.
Its largest expense was payments to the Taliban, which was an estimated $10 million to $20 million per year.